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The contributions on cloud communities and citizenship in this blog raise 
both hopes and fears. The reality of an idea initially as outlandish as citizens 
of a digital cloud is materialising as we ponder and debate its practices. 
Political theory and the law must attempt to keep up with these rapidly 
changing circumstances. This comment raises some questions regarding 
three assumptions in this debate:
 1. Cloud states1 have no territory
 2. Cloud states cannot exert violence
 3. Cloud state membership is based on choice
To illustrate and perhaps formulate a response to these assumptions, it 
might benefit this futuristic debate to consult experiences from the past. As 
suggested by the other contributors, the current transformation of the state 
as a consequence of the ‘digital revolution’ is profound. Nothing less than a 
separation of the state from its traditional connectedness to territory is sug-
gested. The historic event that comes close to matching such a seismic shift 
in the structure of the state was the American and French Revolutions, which 
set in motion the institutional untying of state and church. A historical paral-
lel is quickly drawn: if these revolutions led to the separation of Church and 
State that resulted in secular states, will the digital revolution lead to the 
separation of Territory and State that results in cloud states?
1 I use the term ‘cloud state’ rather than ‘cloud community’, as the latter 
unnecessarily obscures the fact that, at least in this debate, the question is 
whether clouds can fulfill certain political functions traditionally belonging to 
the state, such as conferring citizenship. Assuming that these political func-
tions can indeed be performed by clouds, this leaves no reason to call a cloud 
anything else than a ‘state’, except to dissociate the cloud from the negative 
connotations of the state and calling it by the more cozy term community. 
However, in my opinion, one should not appropriate the political function of 
the traditional state and simultaneously obscure the responsibility – which 
states sometimes fail to exercise – that is inherent to that function.
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 Assumption 1: Cloud states have no territory
Robert Post, focusing on legislation in his blog post, argues: ‘A world in 
which every community is voluntary is a world in which every norm is also 
voluntary. It is therefore a world without law. Because politics is the social 
form by which we create law, it is also a world without politics.’
For Post, a cloud state, which does not impose legislation, is not a 
state at all. One can imagine that arguments sounding very similar were 
once raised by opponents of the separation of Church and State: ‘a secu-
lar, neutral state, which does not impose public morals, is not a state at 
all.’ I raise this parallel not to disagree with Post. Rather, it is to show 
that after centuries of debate on secularism we have come to understand 
that ‘neutrality’ of the state is an impossibility; a state always makes 
choices that impact a state’s public sphere. That is to say that the oppo-
nents of the separation of Church and State were wrong in the first place 
because the starting premise of their critique, that the secular state would 
be neutral, was incorrect.
The starting premise of the cloud state is that it is nonterritorial. Now that 
we have come to know that ‘neutrality’ does not really exist, the question 
arises if we have to conclude that ‘nonterritorial clouds’ do not really exist 
either. In other words, is the cloud itself not territory? I do not mean this in 
the strict physical sense that clouds have servers that are located in territorial 
states, which itself is a valid point; yet the development of serverless cloud 
computing in the future might undermine such an argument. To think of the 
cloud as somehow territory-less and border-less is incongruous if one appre-
ciates that territory itself is not a natural phenomenon but a man-made con-
struct the meaning of which is dynamic and can come to encompass 
non-physical spaces.
 Assumption 2: Cloud states cannot exert violence
Focusing on violence in his comment, Michael Blake states: ‘My own chal-
lenge is broader: the protection of human rights, I believe, can only be 
accomplished by means of violence and force, in both policing and in pun-
ishment – and this violence is in our world reserved (as a matter of right, if 
not reality) for use by states.’
Blake argues that cloud states cannot protect human rights. A comparison 
with anti-separationists in the French Revolution is again not far away: they 
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would claim that ‘secular states cannot protect God’s law’. To make his 
argument, Blake relies heavily on state force. But why could cloud states not 
impose their own forms of digital violence? Perhaps an obvious damage 
they could inflict is to one’s reputation. An example of this is the social 
credit system proposed by the Chinese government, which is a national rep-
utation system that assigns social credit to citizens. The flipside of such 
reputation systems that aim to promote ‘good citizenship’ behaviour is the 
potential social devaluation of ‘bad’ citizens, which can go as far as seri-
ously harming their wellbeing and possibilities in life. A punishment in 
terms of such social devaluation imposed by the cloud state is conceivably 
more painful and restricting to the individual than traditional methods of 
punishment, such as fines or jail.
As with territory, one could counter this claim by saying that what mat-
ters for statehood is physical, rather than non-physical, violence. In that 
case, the actual core of the matter is the physicality of the traditional state’s 
territory and violence compared to the non-physicality of the cloud state’s 
territory and violence. That raises a question that is yet to be addressed by 
proponents of cloud states: What is desirable about the non-physicality of 
territory and violence that makes cloud states and their citizenship superior 
to traditional states and their citizenship?
 Assumption 3: Cloud state membership is based on choice
Focusing on the idea of consent-based cloud communities, Rainer Bauböck 
writes: ‘My response is that this would be fatal for democracy. Already 
Aristotle knew that, unlike families, democratic polities are associations 
of diverse individuals. The territorial bases and automatic attribution 
mechanisms of citizenship create political community among individuals 
that differ profoundly in their interests, identities and ideas about the com-
mon good.’
In short, for Bauböck choice cannot be constitutive for political member-
ship (citizenship). Hence, the chosen membership of cloud states is not citi-
zenship. This is a difficult topic, and the parallel with the earlier (French) 
revolution escapes me. The reason for this is that in the secular revolution 
separating Church and State the ‘onus’ of choice fell on the Church and not 
the State: It was religion and the freedom to choose individually one’s 
 religion that was guaranteed by the secular state. By contrast, in the digital 
revolution separating Territory and State the opening up of choice is focused 
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on the newfound states among which individuals can choose. In fact, one 
might even be limited in exiting from a territory (think refugees, political 
activists) yet have the freedom to select from a range of cloud states one 
wants to join.
Yet, the notions of choice and voluntariness applied in this context 
leave many questions unanswered. It is still unclear in what way we under-
stand membership in a cloud state to be a ‘choice’. The Chinese social 
credit system mentioned earlier may become mandatory as of 2020. Such 
a turn towards explicitly mandatory membership will probably not always 
happen, but what idea of choice do we have in mind when saying that 
cloud membership is a ‘choice’? Is it rational choice theory, which has 
long been refuted in psychology? The conditions that move people to 
decide on their cyber membership, as well as their non-rational motiva-
tions, have to be taken into account for a more realistic conception of 
choice.
The question of chosen membership is closely related to issues concern-
ing identity. The idea that individuals are able to ‘create’ their own identi-
ties, which is implicit in Liav Orgad’s contribution, is mistaken. Iris Marion 
Young makes a helpful distinction between associations and social groups to 
tease out the distinct role of identity when membership is based on choice. 
Young argues that that the contract model of society applies to associations 
but not to social groups: ‘Individuals constitute associations; they come 
together as already formed persons and set them up, establishing rules, posi-
tions, and offices.’ (my emphasis).2 In contrast, social groups, in which our 
identities are implicated, involve a much more complex process: ‘Group 
affinity (…) has the character of (…) “thrownness”: one finds oneself as a 
member of a group, whose existence and relations one experiences as always 
already having been.’ This does not mean that one cannot change one’s 
group affinity, for example by changing one’s gender identity as trans- 
persons do. For Young, these cases illustrate thrownness precisely because 
such changes are ‘experienced as a transformation in one’s identity.’ This 
phenomenological approach to social groups shows that a deeper affinity is 
involved in the process of membership and that social groups, which impli-
cate our identity, cannot be explained solely by ‘choice’. Young and Bauböck 
therefore agree that citizenship and choice are irreconcilable, though they do 
so from different standpoints: for Bauböck the presence of choice in 
 communities leads to a democratic deficit, for Young it leads to a social defi-
2 Young, I. M. (1989), ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of 
Universal Citizenship’, Ethics 99: 250–274, at 260.
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cit, a lack of social affinity or belonging. To respond to this complex debate 
relating to membership, the nature of cloud membership requires further 
clarification as to its position on citizenship, identity and choice.
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